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Abstract – Traditionally, for tactical Command & Control 
(C2), the Marine Corps utilized strictly voice communications as 
a result of continued reliability, modern innovative technology 
vulnerabilities, and the lack of ubiquitous data connectivity.  
Recently, driven by the technology advances there has been a 
shift in the paradigm toward more utilization of data applica-
tions, such as tactical chat and Blue Force tracker. In this paper, 
we present distributed, wireless, cellular-handset integration 
concepts to significantly increase data capabilities on the battle-
field.  We envision three different technical approaches to inte-
grating cellular handset (i) modifying the handset’s software to 
facilitate tethering with deployed tactical radios, (ii) bridging 
with a standalone mobile cellular base station, and (iii) modifying 
the military tactical radios and minimally modifying the cellular 
handsets to create secure wireless interoperability.  An alterna-
tive to these solutions would be to entirely replace military com-
munications with a commercial equivalence.  In this approach, a 
mobile base station would provide coverage for each area of op-
eration with a satellite connection for reachback.  We analyze 
each approach regarding its impact on the amount of equipment, 
reliability or security, and cost per unit. We conclude, based on 
lab experiments and field testing that the most promising solution 
is a software upgrade for the commercial cellular handsets and 
tactical radios to prevent additional hardware dependencies, 
increase cellular security, and reduce the changes to the current 
infrastructure. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper focuses on military communication assets normally 
inherent to Marine Corps Infantry company level elements, 
because of the first author’s familiarity with the technology 
and needs of the warfighter.  However, the concepts explained 
throughout the paper can be applied independent of any one 
service.  Current communications inherent to the company 
level consist of single channel, half duplex radios.  These ra-
dios are becoming increasingly more capable with the ability 
to transfer data across the same link as for voice.  Recent tech-
nological advances in tactical radios facilitate the capability of 
sending and receiving standard Internet Protocol (IP) packets.  
This characteristic increases the capability of the radios to 
support the requirements of network-centric, modern warfare.  
As Marine Corps General Alfred M. Gray said to Congress in 
the 90’s, “Intelligence without communications is irrelevant, 
communications without intelligence is noise.”  Timely intel-
ligence dissemination is extremely critical in modern warfare. 
The traditional method of transmitting intelligence solely via 
voice communications fails to provide efficient results.  For 
example, the saying, “a picture is worth a thousand words,” 
seems accurate when attempting to describe a suspect’s physi-
cal description.  It might take a soldier a couple of minutes to 
transcribe or explain the description; however, a picture cap-
tured through a cellular handset or digital camera could drasti-
cally increase the accuracy of information, while reducing 
message generation times.  Every warfighter is capable of col-
lecting intelligence; however, until recently only radio opera-
tors were capable of disseminating this information via a voice 
transmission.  This paper will discuss various methods to fur-
ther extend the IP based capability out to every ground troop.  
The concept facilitates the idea of providing every Sailor, Sol-
dier, Marine, and Airmen the ability to send and receive com-
munications from a handheld device, while in garrison or ope-
rationally deployed.  This revolutionary technology which 
excelled the commercial sector light years ahead can now ad-
vance our battlefield communication infrastructure without 
crippling the integrity. 
II. PROBLEM 
Modern cellular handsets lead a wave of innovations within 
the commercial industry to provide revolutionary business 
capabilities, but are nonexistent in military operational envi-
ronments.  This is in part due to the security vulnerabilities of 
the current commercial cellular technology.  Yet such devices 
bring many capabilities of a traditional personal computer in a 
handheld form factor and at an extremely low cost in compari-
son.  It is unwise to totally ignore their potential for delivering 
information across the battlefield at high capacity data rates. 
The Marine Corps attempted to leverage a similar commercial 
technology by adopting the components of a personal digital 
assistant (PDA) and converting it into a Dismounted Data Au-
tomated Communication Terminal (D-DACT) to meet military 
specifications.  However, the end result increased the cost 
from roughly a $400 Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) 
PDA to a $10000 - $15000 Government-Off-The-Shelf 
(GOTS) device. The size increased from a couple ounces to a 
couple pounds with batteries attached.  The tradeoff in size 
and price significantly limit the desirability of the technology.  
Future integration attempts must maximize the commercial 
technology while limiting changes necessitated by mitigating 
essential security vulnerabilities.   
The primary function of the D-DACT devices is for situation 
awareness enhancement.  Obviously, these devices are ex-
tremely useful as opposed to a standard map and compass.  
They are a valuable asset for the specific individuals assigned 
as navigators; however, the remaining troops lack additional 
communication capabilities beyond their handheld, voice-only 
radios.  The radios capable of transmitting data are traditional-
ly assigned to select individuals; although, the radio’s data 
capability can only be leveraged if tethered to a PC via a don-
gle and Ethernet cable making their use unsuitable for dis-
mounted soldiers.  Therefore, at least at the company level, we 
routinely fought in voice-only communications environment. 
A.  Centralized Architecture 
The most capable integrated voice and data device capable of 
extending the military’s tactical edge without further encum-
bering the user seems to be cellular handsets.  However, tradi-
tional cellular architectures depend on highly reliable, land-
based networks.  Multiple base stations coordinate and ex-
change traffic via switching centers, imposing a centralized, 
hierarchical architecture.  This is problematic for environ-
ments that require a highly-mobile, ad-hoc, wireless network.  
In an intermittent communications environment the centra-
lized architectures fail to meet the common criteria of provid-
ing independency.  Additionally, centralized architectures can 
create single points of failures with the potential for catastro-
phe: if one link dies, the entire communication tree structure 
fails below the severed connection. 
B.  Hardware Security 
As specified by the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) military radios capable of holding Communica-
tion Security (COMSEC) cryptographic material needs to 
comply with Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 
140-2 level 2 or higher in order to prevent tampering or re-
verse engineering of cryptographic devices [1].  This capabili-
ty is not inherent to commercial cellular handsets.  To achieve 
these requirements, significant modifications are required of 
the electronic components.  As these modifications require 
hardware changes, the potential for individual unit cost signif-
icantly increases.  In addition to high cost, these hardware 
modifications would require additional COMSEC procedure 
considerations.  As with current COMSEC devices that require 
special handling, accountability, and storage restrictions, these 
modifications would inhibit convenience and reduce desirabil-
ity.   
C.  Information Security 
The same standard, FIPS 140-2, designed to protect crypto-
graphic devices, alludes to the level of encryption required for 
each security classification.  However, High Assurance Inter-
net Protocol Encryptor (HAIPE) or Suite B are National Secu-
rity Agency (NSA) categories specifically designed to aid in 
the creation of devices or algorithms for protection of classi-
fied information [2,3].     Commercial industry does manufac-
ture a HAIPE categorized cell phone (Secure Mobile Envi-
ronment Portable Electronic Device (SME PED)) [4]. These 
are Type 1 NSA approved devices for transmitting classified 
data across the cellular networks.  The disadvantages to this 
device are the relatively high cost, single vendor market, and 
lack of software portability.  Alternatively, the Suite B catego-
ry was created to enable non-hardware specific development 
(software algorithms) for commercial products to process clas-
sified information.  This facilitates decoupling the hardware 
from the encryption process.  Accordingly, a software algo-
rithm (e.g. AES 256) can protect data with up to a SECRET 
classification.  This is advantageous for commercial cellular 
handsets vendors because many devices are capable of per-
forming software encryption and decryption at suitable speeds. 
D.  Emission Security 
Even if commercial cellular handsets were generic enough to 
eliminate the desire for reverse engineering or contained en-
cryption algorithms suited for protecting information at an 
appropriate classified level, the devices are still insufficient for 
“outside-the-wire” operations.  Low Probability of Detection 
(LPD) signals are the “result of measures used to hide or dis-
guise intentional electromagnetic transmissions [2].”  These 
types of signals delay or prevent an adversary from determin-
ing if the signals exist [5].  Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) 
signals are “the result of measures to prevent the intercept of 
intentional electromagnetic transmissions [2].”  This type of 
signal either delays or prevents an adversary from capturing 
the detected signal [5].  Spread spectrum signals have poten-
tial to mitigate vulnerabilities by spreading the signal across a 
wide-band when the adversaries are without the synchroniza-
tion schemes [5].  However, although Code Division Multiple 
Access (CDMA) signals leverage spread spectrum, the syn-
chronization schemes for cellular standards remain in the pub-
lic domain to allow interoperability.  Furthermore, the spread-
ing in these cellular standards is insufficient for adequately 
reducing the magnitude of the signal’s power spectral density 
to be considered LPD or LPI at reasonable distances.  There-
fore, the spread spectrum characteristic will not solely provide 
enough protection against the potential threat without a pri-
vate, custom spreading scheme. 
III. RELATED WORK 
There exist numerous exercises and events aimed at integrat-
ing cellular technology with military communications [6] [7].  
However, the topologies normally leverage satellite connectiv-
ity for reachback communications, which is rarely readily ac-
cessible by the majority of combat units.  From the personal 
experience of the first author, only high priority missions or 
division level units are allocated satellite channels.  Addition-
ally, each exercise is developed as a demonstration of indus-
try’s innovative technologies with dozens of vendor consor-
tiums.  However, the concepts are designed for higher level, 
large scale employments.  These implementations all fail when 
applied to a company and below level element.  The primary 
takeaways from these demonstrations are the growing impor-
tance of voice over internet protocol (VoIP) infrastructures 
and the requirement of various switches to integrate legacy 
communication equipment.  These characteristics are common 
and necessary for any scalable communication architecture. 
In our research we have found a couple of industry leaders 
have available units to demonstrate a true Peer-to-Peer (P2P) 
architecture where traditional cellular base stations are no 
longer a requirement.  These phones are capable of forming an 
internal ad-hoc wireless network without any access point 
dependencies.  However, as the technology is just developing 
the cost per unit outweighs the benefit of the technology.  
The Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO), Joint Tactical 
Radio Systems (JTRSs) has developed the Software Commu-
nication Architecture (SCA) and Application Programming 
Interfaces (APIs) standards to facilitate interoperability be-
tween military communication assets [8].  The intent is to 
build software with Government Purpose Rights (GPR) capa-
ble of leveraging the Software Define Radio (SDR) characte-
ristics in an effort to facilitate innovative technologies and 
allowing future integration.  For example, a JTRS waveform 
named the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) Common 
Air Interface (CAI) is capable of providing Military Satellite 
Communications (MILSATCOM).  This waveform was de-
veloped from a cellular protocol (i.e., wideband CDMA 
(WCDMA)) [9].  The relevant work associated with the effort 
is the open architecture concept with cellular air interface.  
This provides a framework or platform to implementing our 
concepts without hardware modifications. 
The idea of leveraging cellular technology is desirable for 
many reasons, however, without GPR the concepts receives 
little attention.  A second generation (2G) cellular open source 
base station (OpenBTS) project was initiated to bring the cel-
lular technology to the developing world at a fraction of the 
cost.  Their work is related, because they decouple the GSM 
air interface from the remaining switching requirements tradi-
tional to the protocol.  The entire software based base station 
code operates on a Linux OS with an attached RF frontend 
provided by a SDR.  
Since the traditional fixed cellular infrastructure is not suitable 
for employment in highly-mobile, military operations, nor 
responsive enough for disaster response and relief activities, 
commercial industry has developed mobile variants.  These 
mobile variants normally contain the infrastructure of the cel-
lular technology in two man portable containers.  The intent of 
the design is for the devices to be deployed aboard an aerial 
platform, land vehicle, or at a remote Forward Operating Base 
(FOB).  The devices are capable of providing 2.5G/3G/4G 
cellular service.  The coverage areas of these devices are de-
pendent on the technology and the terrain throughout the Area 
of Operations (AO).  The technology has been demonstrated at 
various military exercises; however, to our knowledge no U.S. 
military service has deployed any of the devices in an opera-
tional capacity [6] [7] [10]. These devices employ the same 
type of signals resident within traditional cellular base sta-
tions.  The main advantage to the form factor is the mobility 
characteristic.  Since these devices are man-portable and ve-
hicle-mountable, the technology can support highly mobile 
operations.  In addition to the form factor and with added 
software or hardware, the Mobile Base Stations (MBS) can be 
supplemented with end-to-end or link encryption algorithms 
for protecting the data.  However, given the COTS technolo-
gy, the signals lack the Emission Control (EMCON) require-
ments of typical military applications.   
IV. CONCEPTS 
The following concepts were determined to be the most feasi-
ble.  However, they are not a comprehensive representation of 
the possibilities. 
A.  Bridging Device Concept 
As mentioned in the related work section, the commercial in-
dustry attempts to mitigate the vulnerabilities associated with 
intermittent backhaul communications (i.e. the centralized 
architecture vulnerability) by reducing the hardware footprint 
to self-contained, mobile modules.  These devices were de-
signed to support large numbers of users and come with an 
extremely high per unit cost.  Further, the concept of employ-
ment needs to take into consideration down time for equip-
ment failures; otherwise, the large number of supported users 
could potentially remain without communications.  Based on 
these considerations and emission security vulnerabilities the 
bridging concept should only be considered for garrison or 
“inside the wire” employment scenarios.  This bridging con-
cept facilitates integrating a completely unmodified COTS 
technology, essentially creating a cost effective solution.  
However, considering the wireless vulnerabilities any outside-
the-wire operations are not feasible with high EMCON level 
restrictions.   
B.  Tethered Concept 
In order to integrate the technology without delaying years for 
the acquisition process and DoD policy changes, a tethered 
approach can provide the interim solution.  This concept re-
quires software modification to a preexisting ruggedized cellu-
lar handset.  The software modification enables the handset to 
directly connect to a tactical radio via a shared USB to Ether-
net cable.  Currently traditional handsets are configured as 
USB clients for data transfers.  This concept modifies the 
software by adding the USB host functionality.  In the end, 
allowing the handset to attach as an additional network node 
from any IP capable radio.  As before, end-to-end encryption 
algorithms are desirable for content protection.  The disadvan-
tage to this concept is fairly evident given the wired connec-
tion between the device and the tactical radio. 
C.  Directly Via Wireless Interface Concept 
In order to eliminate the proximity limitation a wireless inter-
face is required.  The final concept assumes the tactical radios 
can provide a platoon size element sufficient communication 
capabilities when integrated with cellular handset interopera-
bility.  This concept modifies the military radios to act as 
access points when beyond either commercial cellular connec-
tivity or inherent mobile base stations range (i.e. the first con-
cept).  We suggest five major modifications to the handset and 
tactical radio: (i) limited handset modifications, (ii) leverage 
Software Defined Radio (SDR) characteristics inherent to tac-
tical radios, (iii) LPI modification to the cellular air interface, 
(iv) decoupling the air interface from remaining infrastructure 
requirements, and (v) including client software for sufficient 
content protection. 
1.  Strategic Modifications Based On Cost 
In an effort to minimize cost, while increasing integration fea-
sibility the majority of the modifications shall reside on the 
tactical radios vice the handsets.  The proposed modifications 
to the cellular handsets shall be limited, because the potential 
demand will never significantly offset production cost.  Given 
the tactical radios are already extremely expensive in compari-
son the leveraged tactical radio platform shall contain hard-
ware characteristics capable of integrating the technology via 
software modifications.  For example, the MOUS waveform 
leverages the Wideband-CDMA protocol, which in compari-
son to our single channel half duplex radios could minimize 
additional hardware requirements. 
2. Software Defined Radio Characteristic 
This concept suggests leveraging modern tactical radios con-
taining Software Defined Radio (SDR) functionality with the 
Radio Frequency (RF) frontend (i.e. two transceivers) capable 
of hosting the chosen cellular waveform.  By leveraging these 
SDR characteristics inherent to our upcoming company level 
radios the concepts becomes feasible through a firmware up-
grade eliminating potential hardware modifications.  This 
modification reduces the overall cost of employment and eli-
minates the dependency on single vendor solutions, however, 
fails to account for emission security vulnerabilities.   
3. Air Interface Consideration 
As mentioned before, the overall cost greatly affects the level 
of feasibility.  In effort to minimize cost thus minimizing 
handset modifications a cellular air interface should be leve-
raged and modified to incorporate LPI characteristics.  A 
commercial cellular air interface is suggested vice the military 
equivalent, because the handset’s residual hardware (i.e. the 
RF frontend, etc.) only support cellular protocols.  Otherwise, 
the handsets hardware would need completely redesigned.  As 
mentioned previously, the modification to the tactical radios to 
support this interface is minimal on radios containing the 
MUOS waveform.  The IEEE 802.16e standard contains de-
sirable functionality, but is still vulnerable to various attacks.  
Therefore, if the protocol is modified to mitigate these limita-
tions the remaining hardware would support the new chipset.  
In this example, the tactical radios would need to be modified 
to incorporate the new 802.16e standard.  When developing 
this new air interface specific frequency allocation considera-
tions should be taken to account for the potential environments 
military services will encounter.  An example of this concept 
is the Harris SecNet 11 technology.  SecNet 11 was developed 
from the 802.11 standard and provides Type-1 security [11]. 
 
4. Interoperability Consideration 
In an effort to eliminate the traditional centralized cellular 
architecture and increase interoperability with legacy systems, 
a decoupled air interface is required to eliminate remaining 
infrastructure dependencies.  For example, the air interface 
can provide sufficient connectivity from the handsets to the 
tactical radios and a secure Voice over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP) infrastructure can provide backhaul interoperability.  
This would require the tactical radios to host a private branch 
exchange server for routing local calls in addition to integrat-
ing larger systems.  For data, the radio would consolidate the 
frames into packets and route accordingly.  However, the con-
tent is not protected without some level of encryption within 
each layer. 
5. Content Protection Consideration 
When considering protecting the data each device will need 
the ability to authenticate, encrypt, and decrypt the informa-
tion being transmitted.  When developing this software solu-
tion, a Suite B algorithm is desirable to prevent provisioned 
handsets from requiring hardware modifications to account for 
cryptographic interoperability.  With a Suite B algorithm, the 
handsets would not be required to adhere to restrictive COM-
SEC handling procedures.  Obviously, the associated tactical 
radios need to be retrofitted with the same algorithms.  How-
ever, this seems less difficult since commercial industry al-
ready advertises radios with this capability [12]. 
V. EXPERIMENTS 
The concepts presented in the previous sections require specif-
ic testing for validation. As a starting point and based on the 
current capabilities resident in the commercial market, we 
recently conducted a series of proof-of-concept experiments.  
The section is divided into one field environment and two lab 
exploration experiments. 
A. CELLULAR BRIDGE EXPERIMENT 
In an effort to explore the feasibility of hosting cellular Local 
Area Networks (LAN)s at the edge of military tactical Wide 
Area Networks (WANs), we designed an experiment to leve-
rage commercial cellular mobile base stations as bridging de-
vices.  In the process of exploring the feasibility of extending 
our tactical networks by including cellular edges we designed 
an integrated architecture and evaluated it during a Tactical 
Network Topology (TNT) Capabilities Based Experimentation 
(CBE) exercise.  The Naval Postgraduate School conducts the 




Figure 1 - TNT CBE Topology 
Our participation during the TNT event was limited to evaluat-
ing the tactical radio throughput restrictions, the throughput of 
commercial base stations, and the resource requirements 
needed to support cellular handset integration.  The topology 
(Figure 1) was designed to force each cellular base station to 
utilize military tactical radio links for interconnectivity.  The 
design includes:  
 (3) wirelessly interconnecting Harris AN/PRC-117G ra-
dios configured with the Advanced Networking Wide-
band Waveform (ANW2) to act as one Mobile Ad-hoc 
Network (MANET). 
 (3) tethered LGS Innovation’s Tactical Base Station Rou-
ters (TacBSRs), which are 2.5G mobile cellular base sta-
tions (2 Picocells emitting 320 mW and 1 Marcocell emit-
ting 20W) 
 (3) Cisco 3200 Series WiFi Ruggedized Routers (leve-
raged to benchmark against GPRS throughput) 
 (2) vehicle mounted Sony IP Cameras 
 (18) Nokia E51s, (3) HTC Touchs, and (3) HP iPAQ Cell 
Phones 
 Dell PowerEdge 2850, 3GB Processor, 8GBs RAM, with 
Windows 2003 Server & Reality Vision (video software) 
The AN/PRC-117G radios are capable of directly connecting 
via the Ethernet dongle to an external computer or handheld 
device without intermediate switch or router.  However, for 
this experiment we included additional devices for added 
functionality.  The ANW2 mission plan was configured for 
305.00 MHz as the center frequency with 5 Mhz bandwidth.  
During our throughput testing the radios displayed a Wave-
form Identification (WID) number of seven.  With only a few 
tests due to limited time, we observed a wired UDP rate of 250 
– 350 Kpbs and a TCP rate of 20 – 25 Kbps leveraging Test 
TCP (TTCP) as the measurement tool [13].  The tests were not 
comprehensive, did not take place in multiple environments, 
and are not intended for evaluating the waveforms potential.  
However, the results suggest integration feasibility excluding 
operational employments requiring a high level of emission 
security.  As explained in section II.d., these emission security 
requirements are unattainable without modifying the cellular 
signals or introducing a military waveform on a cellular hand-
set.  Throughout the exercise, the tactical SDRs successfully 
hosted two separate Pico-cell and one Macro-cell networks, 
each containing six simultaneous voice / data channels.  Es-
sentially we converted a single channel half-duplex radio into 
a six-channel full duplex cellular base station access point. 
In an effort to evaluate the potential of live video streaming 
from a mobile platform to either a fix site (i.e. HQ element) or 
additional mobile platform, we leveraged commercial software 
(Reality Vision).  For this experiment we conducted a series of 
test benchmarking the GPRS, WiFi, and wired LANs (Figure 
2).  The wireless streaming video initiated from a cellular 
handsets internal camera, then traversed either the GPRS or 
WiFi routers.  The fixed IP cameras feed traversed a wired 
link until crossing the tactical radios.  To test the GPRS capa-
bility (Figure 2), we disabled the WiFi interface on the hand-
sets.  At first, the observed frame rates discredited the concept 
of leveraging these military radios for streaming live video.  
However, after disabling the GPRS and enabling the WiFi 
interface (Figure 3), the observed delay was trivial in compari-
son.  To test the theory we eliminated all wireless cameras by 
directly connecting fixed IP cameras via the tactical radios 
Ethernet cable (Figure 4).  The observed delays were similar 
to the WiFi access point delays. 
Figure 2 - GPRS Topology 
 
Figure 3 - WiFi Topology 











Figure 4 - Fixed IP Camera Topology 
We conclude the tactical radios leveraged were not a bottle-
neck when interconnecting GPRS capable base stations.  The 
results suggest a potential for hosting 3G networks on the edge 
of our tactical networks [13]. 
B. TETHERED EXPLORATION 
For the tethering concept, we carried out some preliminary lab 
exploration to determine concept validity.  We found cell 
phones can easily connect to an IP based network through a 
USB cable attached to a personal computer.  However, we 
have been unsuccessful in directly connecting an Ethernet 
dongle from an IP capable tactical radio.  After reviewing a 
couple of devices (HTC Dream with Android OS, Apple’s 
iPhone, and RIM’s Blackberry) we concluded the hardware is 
capable of providing the functionality by leveraging a Univer-
sal Serial Bus (USB) On The Go (OTG) Host characteristic, 
but in the absence of a working device driver we cannot indis-
putably conclude on the feasibility [14] [15]. 
C. WIRELESS INTERFACE AND SOFTWARE DEFINED RADIO 
EXPLORATION 
As a step toward solidifying our feasibility assessment of inte-
grating a cellular base station capability via a software imple-
mentation, we configured in a lab environment, the open 
source OpenBTS software on a Linux computer with attached 
SDR (USRP v1).  The OpenBTS software provided the BTS 
capability, when concurrently run with a few OS (Ubuntu 
9.04) inherent programs.  The open source VoIP software As-
terisk was initiated to account for the Private Branch Ex-
change (PBX) requirement.  GNURadio was installed and 
initiated as the signal processing package (USRP initiator).  A 
VoIP client was installed to initiate voice calls from the com-
puter.  The most relevant hardware difference between our 
tactical radios and the USRP configuration appears to be the 
dual transceivers needed for the BTS full-duplex characteristic 
as most tactical radios have only one transceiver.  The results 
of our lab configurations suggest that for a complete off-the-
shelf software integration concept the OpenBTS software is 
feasible with two tactical radios.  However, more testing is 
needed to determine the level of feasibility.  For example, a 
requirement of two radios to run a vulnerable cellular signal 
seems improbable when an additional radio is still needed for 
reachback connectivity.  As an alternative, a MUOS capable 
SDR should be considered since the waveform already shares 
similar properties with WCDMA [9].  The related work to this 
project is closely coupled to the Joint Tactical Radio System 
program.  Production radios are not available with the MUOS 
waveform.  Therefore, specific testing beyond these initial 
observations is not possible. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In summary, the concepts mentioned during this paper appear 
feasible.  The tethering concept is an “age old” “tried and 
true” method, however, the COTS handsets are not developed 
for military austere environments.  Perhaps, given the high 
demand for a near term solution, the handheld devices are 
restricted to environments not requiring the complex rugge-
dized hardware.  These phones are currently hundreds of dol-
lars compared to thousands of dollars for each military tactical 
radio.  The concept of buying disposable cell phones ($300 
versus $2000) might provide the interim solution and policy 
suggestion as an alternative to the high priced ruggedized var-
iation.  These devices would still be required to pass through 
the government certification and accreditation process.  How-
ever, to leverage the innovative technology perhaps minimal 
risk is acceptable.  Our results show the leveraged tactical 
radios are capable of successfully interconnecting 2.5G cellu-
lar base stations.  Therefore, we’ve demonstrated the possibili-
ty of connecting commercial innovative cellular handset to our 
tactical radios via an external bridge device.  However, more 
exploration is required to determine the estimated cost, level 
of feasibility, and complexity for developing a non-bridged 
proof of concept.  Our research lacked the resources to imple-
ment various concepts on relevant FPGAs.  The next step 
beyond our approaches would be to implement the software on 
an FPGA similar to those contained within military tactical 
radios.  This will require significant modification to the BTS 
software to account for the different hardware. 
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